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The cocktail party planned at the Lima, Peru home of Japanese envoy Morihisa Aoki was
not meant to be exceptional. The event, scheduled for December 17, 1996, was intended as a
relaxed, pre-holiday celebration of Emperor Akihito’s 63"* birthday. The diplomatic officials of
most embassies in Lima were invited for light cocktails and pre-Christmas conversation. No
business was planned for the evening, and many of the officials in attendance brought their
spouses, most of whom were well acquainted after years of circulating among similar gatherings.
Approximately 600 people attended the party arriving throughout the early evening. A few
minutes past seven o’clock, everything changed. Dressed as waiters bearing trays of champagne
and hors d’oeuvres, about 20 guerrillas slipped in through the service entry. Within fifteen
minutes, they set a series of explosions and took 376 diplomats and government officials hostage.
Included amongst the hostages were the Japanese ambassador, the Bolivian ambassador, the
Peruvian foreign minister, the minister of finance, the head of Peru’s national Anti-Terrorism
Bureau, a Supreme Court Justice, several Congressmen, and the mother and brother of Peruvian
president Alberto Fujimori.

The crisis would not reach an end until the afternoon of April 22, 126 days later. Three
months of laborious negotiations would give way to a commando strike of 80 Peruvian soldiers
and the deaths of all MRTA hostage-takers. The actions taken in this incident, by both the
Peruvian and Japanese governments, led to unprecedented developments for each in the areas of
diplomacy and crisis management. By global diplomatic scales, the crisis was handled fairly
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routinely. Within the context of contemporary political hostage incidents, the compromises
achieved and lessons learned from this hostage event hardly demonstrated a new and innovative
model of bilateral cooperation and strategic compromise. They did, however, signify major
divergences by both nations from crisis management precedent. Peru and Japan both left
traditional protocol to find a resolution to this crisis. In the end, both emerged altered by the
experience and satisfied with the course of action.*

In order to understand the remarkable nature of this event, it is first necessary to grasp a
working overview of similar incidents and procedure deemed effective through decades of
increasingly common terrorism. An analysis of the crisis management protocols formerly
utilized by both Peru and Japan, followed by a look at the unique circumstances brought forth by
the hostage crisis at the Japanese embassy, reveal remarkable divergences from tradition for both
in terms of diplomatic management. These nations which had before only negotiated on an
economic level forged a unique bond in the course of their involvement. Peru and Japan, widely
divergent in their diplomatic philosophies, found a new and acceptable middle ground while in
pursuit of a resolution for a shared problem. Both nations sought to emerge from the hostage
incident relatively unscathed. The terms of the most acceptable denouement was different for
both. For Peru, this meant preserving the perception that terrorism had been eliminated, largely
as a result of President Fujimori’s hard-line anti-insurgency tactics. For Japan, a low-cost escape
meant finding a resolution which would not risk the loss of the human lives involved. In the
pursuit of these seemingly opposing goals, a solution emerged which satisfied and proved
beneficial to both parties. This project asserts that this crisis allowed both Peru and Japan to
significantly expand their traditional crisis management tactics, each settling upon a formerly
unacceptable position, maintaining it against the restrictions of precedent, and discovered that it
was operable.
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POLITICAL HOSTAGE TAKING

The taking of hostages is a tactic that has been utilized by warring parties for centuries.
Political hostage taking is defined specifically as the act of illegally holding one or more persons
captive in order to make political demands.^ The earliest contemporary political kidnappings took
place during Castro’s struggle in Cuba.^ These were staged almost entirely for the sake of
publicity. No demands were made, the individuals were just held, then released unharmed.
Eventually, realizing that taking hostages en masse was more effective than claiming them one
by one, airplane hijackings began to take place. The first major modem publicity-oriented
incident occurred elsewhere in Latin America - in Brazil. The U.S. Ambassador to Brazil,
Charles Burke Elbrick, was kidnapped on September 4, 1969.'* In exchange for his release, the
kidnapping groups (a coalition of two Brazilian leftist groups) demanded the immediate
publication of it’s manifesto, the release of fifteen prisoners by the Brazilian government, and a
flight out of the country. The government conceded, and the group’s demands were met.

This incident was soon replicated elsewhere in Latin America as similar kidnappings
took place in Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina, and the Dominican Republic. In recent years,
several major hostage incidents have occurred in the region.^ In 1974, Nicaragua’s Sandanista
insurgents took hostages at a Christmas party. They succeeded in getting one of their comrades,
Daniel Ortega, freed after seven years in jail. In Columbia, the M-19 rebels occupied the
Dominican Republic’s embassy in 1980, holding 57 hostages and 19 diplomats, for 61 days.
That standoff ended peacefully after Cuban leader Fidel Castro mediated. However, five years
later, the same guerrilla group took over the Palace of Justice in Bogota. When the army
invaded, about 100 people died, including 12 supreme court justices. In a similar move in 1982,
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leftist activists seized the Spanish embassy in Guatemala, taking 23 hostages.^ An ensuing
government attack led to much bloodshed. The MRTA attack upon the Japanese embassy was
unexpected, but it was hardly out of context when one considers recent Latin American political
activity.

As the trend of hostage-taking in order to reach political goals became more prevalent,
academics and diplomats came to realize that they had entered into a self-perpetuating cycle. For
the first decade of hostage incidents, governments dealing with them perceived them as
aberrations. Events were handled in a manner which seemed to be mutually beneficial - lives
were saved, even if that meant concession to the demands of the hostage takers. This,
unfortunately, in effect encouraged more acts of terrorism and larger demands. Hostage-taking
quickly came to be seen by many insurgent groups as a successful tactic: an effective way to
publicize an otherwise unpopular or obscure cause, a means of gaining freedom for imprisoned
comrades, or a road to quick riches. The willingness of governments and companies to meet
these demands was taken as a sign of weakness, and thus an easy target for future incidents with
greater demands. Each time a hostage situation ended with no deaths and the terrorist demands
met, it encouraged other groups to do the same. In 1975, hostage incidents reached an all-time
peak. By 1976, it became obvious that a policy-enforced movement towards a tougher stand was
necessitated. Nations, led by Israel, the United States, and France, began to move towards
establishing a protocol against terrorism, with rescue as the first option. To supplement this hard
line stance, negotiations also became more difficult, demands were met less. This was obviously
a risk for governments dealing with hostage-takers. The statistics of an outcome gained through
forceful intervention do not bode well for those considering such drastic measures. A majority
of hostage crises end peacefully and almost always the terrorists’ demands are not met.
However, in the past decade, 80 percent of hostages killed in such situations died during armed
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rescue attempts.^ By standing firm, lives were sure to be lost in the short-run, but, in the long
run, hostage-takers would recognize the increased risk factors and the lessened likelihood that
their demands would be met. This overall decrease in hostage incidents in the long run would
save countless lives which would otherwise be jeopardized should governments continue to meet
demands.

For many nations, the bittersweet lesson that a firm position was beneficial in the long
run was translated into policy solutions. The United States, which plays a major role (by means
of it’s military or it’s media) in most hostage situations, has a policy of absolutely no
negotiations. Despite the US stance, the world has no uniform policy on responding to such
events. A 1976 attempt to draft a United Nations treaty on hostage-taking failed after opposition
by Arab governments. It would, they feared, impede the PLO and other anti-Israeli groups.*

One of the earliest examples of the new trend toward action in hostage events, along with
the first recognition of the human cost that is risked by such a venture, occurred in 1974.
Twenty-one Israeli schoolchildren were killed by Palestinian terrorists as Israeli forces moved in
on a rescue raid. Since this disastrous operation, rescue measures have become much more
prevalent, as well as dangerous. Successful attempts are few and far between. Prior to the Lima
rescue, the most successful rescue occurred two decades ago, Israel’s 1976 rescue at Entebbe,
Uganda, of hijacked air travelers.’ Framing these two successes are several tragic failures,
perhaps the most notable the failed 1972 attempt to rescue captive Israeli Olympians in West
Germany. For the US, the worst debacle came in 1980 in an attempt to rescue hostages held at
the US embassy in Iran, which ended in a complete disaster when a helicopter and a transport
plane collided and burst into flame. The sheer political cost of such a failed effort can be
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measured in the aftermath of this incident. President Carter never quite recovered from his role
in the bungled mission, and soon after lost by a landslide to Ronald Reagan.

The majority of hostage incidents are initiated with the primary objective of the hostagetakers gaining publicity and media attention. Peripheral goals are usually freedom for comrades
or monetary gain.'® In most incidents, regardless of which language is spoken by the hostage
takers, press releases, instructions, or signs are printed in English. This reflects the realization
that, without the attention of the international media, such efforts are futile, and English is the
lingua franca of the world. The group of primary focus in a hostage incident is not the hostages
themselves, but rather the global audience. This was well evidenced in the takeover of the
Japanese embassy. Prior to and during the siege, the MRTA used publicity and media contacts
as their primary weapons in the fight for political legitimacy." This would become a major
factor in the logistical and political considerations which went into the negotiation process.

JAPAN

The development in Japanese policy towards crisis/hostage incidents through the Lima
episode is best understood by considering the role and history of Japan in similar incidents and
it’s role in contemporary Peruvian events. In the past half century, Japan has found itself to be a
prime target for groups seeking monetary or political gain from the use of hostage situations.'^
Following World War II, formerly militaristic Japan was forced into a constitutionally mandated
pacifist state. The military infrastructure was abolished, and research and development efforts
were instead directed to technological and industrial gain into private spheres. Within forty
years, this shift of resources paid off dramatically for Japan, as it took a leading role in the global
export trade market.
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During the 1980’s, Japan became the world’s second largest economy, until growth
tailed off in 1990 and the nation slumped into a recession.'^ Unable to maintain margins of
growth of such magnitude, the Japanese domestic market experienced a 4% downturn between
1990 and 1992. In the past four years, growth has been near zero.'^ Previous export efforts were
increased, and foreign investment increased in order to compensate for slow growth in customary
markets. Much of this growth has been into emerging Latin American markets. For reasons of
both economic expansion and diplomatic obligation, Japan has traditionally offered assistance to
developing nations to which it has or may potentially have political or business interests. The
investments have reached staggering proportions, and usually are accompanied by requirements
for trade policies or development concessions. In a February 1996 address to the Latin
American Association of Japan, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Alexander F.
Watson commended Japan for significant investment packages to South America and the
Caribbean.'^ In 1995 alone, Japan contributed $65 million to El Salvador. In addition, between
1990 and 1994, Japan contributed $72 million in bilateral aid to Haiti. Similar examples of a
hemispheric effort to expand into growth-oriented Latin American markets are seen throughout
the region.

In Peru more than any other Latin American market, Japan has found a comfortable and
even profitable economic relationship. Since the late 19“’ century, tens of thousands of Japanese
have emigrated to Peru.’^ Among these were President Alberto Fujimori’s parents, who came
from Kumamoto in southern Japan in the 1930’s. Fujimori’s election in 1990 proved to be a
catalyst in the relations between Lima and Tokyo. Fujimori, who was bom four months after his
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parents entered Peru,* is the first person of Japanese ancestry to be elected president outside of
Japan. The bond between Fujimori and Japan was cemented long before his ascension to the
presidency. Fujimori, who often labels himself as “100 percent Peruvian,” campaigned largely
on his ability to attract Japanese capital, and he made a month-long official visit to Japan prior to
his inauguration.'^ In a reciprocal visit in August 1996, Japanese President Hashimoto
announced an aid package worth almost $600 million. Almost two dozen Japanese corporations,
ranging from Mitsubishi to Matsushita, have opened new operations in Peru since Fujimori’s
election. These investments, however, have come only with Fujimori’s promise to pursue
neoliberal economic measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. Fujimori, who actually campaigned against these measures in 1990, ended up
implementing the IMF’s austerity measures, his course shift caused mostly by the Japanese aid
offers which were contingent upon his strict compliance with the harsh measures. The most
significant lump sum contribution fi-om Japan, a $100 million international debt package, was
delivered only after Fujimori provided sufficient proof of his ability to sustain the reforms.'*

These reforms, initiated by Fujimori and held in place largely through promises of
Japanese investment, did more to incite the warring guerrilla factions in Peru than it did to pacify
them. While good for investment stability and trade relations, Fujimori’s economic austerity
plans were said to have made life worse for the poor. Over half of Peru’s 24 million people are
in poverty, and few experienced the benefits of the programs.'’ This prompted the wrath of
many Peruvians, especially guerrilla groups. The anger was directed toward a variety of Japanese
corporations and diplomatic entities. The MRTA’s choice of occupying the Japanese embassy
was highly symbolic on this account and was not an isolated event. Over the last six years, the
Japanese embassy in Lima has been a target of four bomb attacks. In 1991, three Japanese aid

’

This has recently been a subject of intense debate in Peru, as his mother’s entry visa
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experts were killed by Maoist Shining Path guerrillas.^® Fujimori’s ethnic, as well as financial,
connection to the Japanese government was a substantial component of Peru’s economic policy.
By taking on something so close to his public identity, (not to mention the public pocketbook)
the MRTA was sure to grab the unrivaled attention of the nation.

Japan’s enormous economic growth in the past decades has not been without some
serious downsides, one of which is a growing number of hostage situations directed towards it’s
citizens or representatives of it’s entities. The combination of extreme growth levels and farreaching expansion into foreign markets has placed Japan increasingly as a preferred target for
hostage incidents.

Japan has a long history of kidnapping incidents involving diplomats and

businessmen. It should be noted that in nearly every case, the desired demands were met.
Japan’s first such major incident took place in 1977, when Japanese Red Army guerrillas
hijacked a Japan Air Lines jet bound for Dhaka. After five days of negotiation, Japan gave in to
the hostage-takers demand of $6 million dollars and the release of 6 imprisoned Red Army
members.^’ (Several are still at large) This incident set a precedent which has since haunted
Japan, in both diplomatic and business relations. Koichi Oizumi, an international relations
professor at Tokyo’s Nippon University, presented this as an event symbolic of the Japanese
ideal of compromise reached through negotiation. In a 1991 interview with the Christian Science
Monitor, he remarked, “Saying ‘We won’t yield’ is a Western idea. Japanese want a peaceful
solution, one that puts respect for life first. This concept systematically reemerges in Japan’s
approach to crises.”^^ In the same article, Japanese analysts asked about the concessions made to
the terrorists acknowledged that paying ransom and acceding to other demands may have
encouraged more hostage-taking and put more lives in jeopardy, but the focus in Japan remained
on saving people currently at risk.

already lists a supposedly still-in-the-womb Alberto as a child.
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No formal policy addressing hostage incidents exists, but the absence of an allencompassing stance on terrorism is indicative of Japan’s handling of hostage incidents. Rather
than typecasting incidents and dealing with them by prescribed operational procedures, Japanese
administrations and corporations have instead approached each incident as an individual
scenario, separate from previous experiences and without future implications. In doing so, the
emphasis is placed purely on resolving the situation at hand, usually through a negotiated
agreement which results in a win-win resolution. Mitsuhiro Kagami, a Latin American specialist
at the government-backed Institute for Developing Economies in Tokyo, stated that a “peaceful
solution” often means a “financial solution” to hostage situations. Hostages are released, money
changes hands, and Japanese hostages usually emerge unharmed.^^ This set of protocol, though
developed mostly through demands made of government entities, also extends to hostage
incidents in the private sector. For Japanese multi-nationals or corporations with foreign offices,
dealing with hostages has become all too common in the past decades. Ransom payments, in
effect, have come to be viewed as another cost of doing business. Most recently, Mamoru
Konnu, president of Sanyo Video Component Corp. (U.S.) was kidnapped in Mexico and
released nine days later, after the company paid a $2 million ransom.

In the past five years

alone, ten Japanese citizens have been kidnapped or murdered in Latin America.^'*

Because of limited levels political involvement, most kidnapper’s demands were ransom
or extortion attempts focused on Japan’s economic wealth. This goal of monetary gain is apt to
change as Japan, the world’s second largest economy, begins to play a more active role in global
affairs. The current Hashimoto administration has put forth several bids to become a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council. So far, this effort has won only a temporary
appointment as one of Asia’s two representatives.^^ This rise in recognized stature among
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nations, especially in dealings with undeveloped nations, translated into political power. Japan
enjoys an increasingly powerful positions in most international economic or diplomatic groups.
It is a primary lender in the IMF, and provides a large amount of aid to several nations. The
growing number of hostage situations marks the risk of this movement overseas.

PERU

In the past two decades, Peru has been through political turmoil that might nearly be
described as a state of civil war. An estimate by the New York Times^^ places the number of
fatalities attributed to the fighting between soldiers and rebels at 35,000. Most of the dead were
civilians. A large part of the social unrest was primarily rooted in economic depressions. In
1980, inflation soared to nearly 60%. By 1983, almost overnight, inflation leapt to nearly
200%.^^ Severe balance of payment problems, compounded by natural disasters, a growing drug
trade, and an immense national debt, created what has been dubbed the worst economic crisis of
Peruvian history. Real wages declined some 40 percent in five years, and 58 percent of the
middle class sank into poverty.^* This marked only the beginning of a decade of fear and
hunger. Between 1987 and 1989, the gross domestic product of Peru dropped by 28 percent,
followed by another 60 percent drop in wages. By the end of the 1980’s, with a population of 22
million, Peru was close to leading the world as a debtor nation.^’

These conditions provided the basis of dissatisfaction and grounds for rebellion that
would culminate in the 1997 hostage crisis. During the early 1980’s, at the height of the
economic crisis, two major revolutionary groups would form in Peru, the MRTA and the Sendero
Luminoso. Only one of these groups, the MRTA, would be directly involved in the hostage

crisis. However, an understanding of the other group, the sheer terror that it conjured in Peruvian
society, and the reaction that it elicited from the Peruvian government, is necessary in order to
grasp a full comprehension of Peru’s absolutist positions against insurgent groups. Sendero
Luminoso, or the Shining Path was a neo-Maoist terrorist group that employed horrific methods
of violence while attempting to bring about the total dissolution of the Peruvian state.^° It
opposed all forms of social or political structures, formal or informal. SL was equally as cruel to
police officers and government officials as it was to neighborhood mothers starting up soup
kitchens. The Shining Path declared complete war on Peru, and, in response to the Shining Path,
the Peruvian government diverted a substantial amount of social funding into military accounts
for counter-offensive measures. David Scott Palmer, who has studied the Shining Path
extensively, estimates that the Shining Path cost the Peruvian government in excess of $25
billion over eight years,^' and forced 600,000 citizens to seek refuge elsewhere.^^

Besides necessitating a new and substantial military expenditure, Sendero Luminoso
also played a significant role in the formation and operating protocol of the official policy
towards rebel groups. The government quickly adapted a zero-tolerance policy towards members
of revolutionary. Beyond this, military counter-terrorism troops went on the offensive to root out
and destroy any traces or suspicions of insurgency. Of the 30,000 dead in the warfare, human
rights groups estimate that at least half could possibly be considered casualties of government
strikes against suspected rebel villages.^^ Any suspected members were summarily executed or
immediately imprisoned in hellish prisons, often without trial or notification of due cause.
Independent human rights groups widely criticized the government methods, as they today
continue to criticize the prison conditions and lack of judicial due process.^^ In 1992, the Shining
Path’s dogmatic and worshipped leader, Abimael Guzman, was captured. This event, added to
the intensified government crackdown on insurgents, allowed Fujimori to cultivate a tough, no-
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nonsense image based upon his absolute unwillingness to negotiate or tolerate any existence of
insurgency. For nearly ten years prior to the siege upon the Japanese embassy, this was the
essence of Peru’s no-negotiations, no-mercy policy against the actions of any armed group. For
the most part, terrorism appeared to be on the wane. Into this scene would enter thirty young
amaruistas balancing champagne trays and toting plastic explosives.

The MRTA
The Movimiento Resistancia de Tupac Amaru, or the MRTA, was named after an 18***
century indigenous rebel leader who fought colonial control.^^ With similar intent, the MRTA
took up arms in 1984 to oppose the harsh economic conditions imposed by the government’s
neoliberal austerity measures. Founded in the shantytowns surrounding Lima, the guiding
principals of the MRTA align closely with many of the Communist principles that led the Cuban
revolution. Originally, the MRTA aligned itself with the Sendero Luminosos, but within a year, it
broke away. The MRTA leaned towards effecting change through public acts of resistance,
utilizing newspapers, television cameras, and declarations. This was in sharp contrast to the
Shining Path preference for snipers, grenades, and public executions. Following this break, the
MRTA was named a target by both the Shining Path leadership and the Peruvian government.
The Shining Path considered the MRTA to be traitors to true Communism, and the government
targeted them as anti-state rebels.

Unable to distinguish between the two groups, or, for that matter, between the rebels and
innocent Peruvian citizens, the Peruvian military carried out a series of violent anti-insurgency
campaigns. The MRTA was never as powerful or violent as the Shining Path, but the group still
posed a significant threat to the Peruvian government. The primary tactics utilized by the
MRTA were ambushing government troops, raiding police patrols, attacking Western embassies.
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robbing banks, kidnapping business executives, bombing American fast-food restaurants, and
sabotaging government sponsored projects.

Most of the MRTA’s revenue is derived from

“taxes” paid by controlling territory in the upper Huallaga Valley.^ Besides basic philosophical
differences, the MRTA and the Shining Path have often warred against each other for territorial
rights in the drug trade. Despite this affiliation with the hemisphere’s largest coca producing
region, the MRTA has enjoyed a “Robin Hood” image of stealing from the rich to help the poor.
As a condition of releasing its kidnap victims, the group often required that food be distributed in
shantytowns.

Total membership of the MRTA is currently estimated to be between 300 and 600
members. An exact figure is unknown because the organization as a whole operates as a network
small, well-armed, well-trained cadres of 20 or 30 people known only to one another.^^ Raids on
single MRTA hideouts do little to break through the widely spread national organization. As
recently as two years ago, officials in Peru believed the MRTA to be defeated. A 1992 raid
captured and imprisoned seven of the MRTA’s highest commanders, including the group’s
leader, Victor Polay.^ Polay is currently serving a life prison term, as is his lieutenant, Peter
Cardenas. The group’s second-in-command, Miguel Rincon (known as Francisco), was captured
in a raid twenty days prior to the hostage-taking at the Japanese embassy. After Polay’s capture,
Nestor Serpa Cartolini became the leader of the MRTA. Under Cartolini, the MRTA
experienced new levels of national and international attention. Cartolini, known in Peru by his
nom de guerre Commandante Evaristo, was a founding member of the group and has always
*

An area in eastern Peru where the majority of Peru’s $52 million/year cocaine crop is

grown.
’
Polay, ironically, was a college roommate of former Peruvian President Alan Garcia in the
early 1970’s.
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ranked high as a military commander. The mastermind behind many of the group s successful
operations, Cartolini surfaced as the organizer and primary negotiator in the embassy incident.

Following a number of debilitating raids and several years in hiding, mostly due to
Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori’s aggressive counterinsurgency campaign, the MRTA has
switched gears, reassessed their plans, and tried to adapt to circumstances that were largely
unfavorable due to the growth of the Peruvian military.^^ In the past three years, controlling
territory and ambushing patrols gave way to “commando-style” missions intended to destabilize
the government and attract media attention. Kidnapping and hostage-taking are major
components of the new MRTA tactics. Following a November 30, 1996 raid on an MRTA Lima
hideout, police investigators reported that they discovered detailed preparations for a hostage
attack on the Peruvian congress.^* As evidence of the seriousness of the threat, police discovered
a significant cache of weapons, diagrams of Congress, maps showing placements of guards, and
replica uniforms for both police and military officers.

This raid should have raised a warning flag to Fujimori and other government officials
that, despite their rhetoric to the contrary, armed insurgency groups within Peru were not totally
defeated. Political violence had declined significantly since 1992, and Fujimori interpreted this
as a sign of surrender on the part of the guerrillas. He began to tout his nation as being free of
fear, the “subversive threat” locked safely away. In 1995, Fujimori re-allocated much of his
estimated 20,000 specially trained counter-terrorist forces into dealing with an armed border
conflict with Ecuador.” The military, lulled by the reassurances the government was sending
out, began to relax it’s guard. Reports indicate that the police were aware of attempts by the
MRTA to regroup in the last few months, but efforts to re-assemble the special forces came just
two weeks before the embassy was taken.
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THE TAKING OF THE EMBASSY:
San Isidro, Lima, Peru; December 17, 1996 - April 24, 1997

The context for the attack, both historically and socially, is the most vital component of
understanding the decisions made by Japan and Peru during the four month ordeal. Both nations
came into the crisis with a unique background and well-defined, historically supported set of
crisis management protocols. Japan had always negotiated, just as Peru had always refused to.
In the end, both nations broke their respective molds and took significant steps towards the
other s style of diplomacy. The accumulated components of the hostage incident, from the initial
response, through the consultation and negotiation process, concluding with public reaction
(Peruvian and Japanese) to the attack, added up to make a large step away from tradition for
those involved.

Following the initial explosion, set by the guerrillas posing as wait staff, the other rebels
used dynamite to blow a hole in the retaining fence from an adjacent house they had been renting
for months. Security had not been increased for the event, despite the fact that the Japanese
ambassador had invited more than 600 international dignitaries. Once their way was cleared, the
guerrillas stormed into the residence wearing gas masks and wielding numerous sorts of
weapons. Inside, the thirty MRTA guerrillas made it quite evident that they had prepared
impeccably for this event. According to Ambassador Anthony Vincent, of Canada, who would
later play a major role as a mediator, the guerrillas interviewed their hostages carefully to
identify them.^ Within a few hours, they let 100 women leave, as well as several elderly or
physically ailing hostages. The MRTA group, led by Comandante Evaristo (a.k.a. Nestor Cerpa),
clearly knew exactly what they were doing. Within five hours after the attack the embassy had
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been surrounded by police, and Nestor Cerpa calmly laid out his demands. (See Appendix #1)
He wanted the “liberation” of all 400 MRTA comrades held by the Peruvian government, a
reversal of Fujimori’s “neoliberal” economic policies, and free-passage for the raid participants
to a rebel stronghold in the Andes area of northern Peru. If the Peruvian government failed to
meet his demands, Cerpa would begin killing hostages. Cerpa’s demands were almost
simultaneously publicized by the MRTA spokesperson in Hamburg, Germany, Isaac Velazco,
through a web page (http://bum.ucsd.edu/~ats/mrta.htm) and hundreds of faxed press releases.
Just as the armed cadre had meticulously planned their assault on the embassy, they carefully laid
out the components of the world-wide publicity blitz which would rocket their actions onto the
world stage.

On the other side of the high embassy walls, the initial response of the Pemvians was
shock. For nearly two years. President Fujimori and high military officials had largely
proclaimed that insurgent factions within Pemvian society had been rooted out and annihilated.
He boasted, even, that he’d annihilated both the SL and the MRTA so completely that only
common criminals remained active.^' The circulation of these reports and their apparent
credibility were large factors in the Japanese ambassador’s lax security on the night of the siege.
Although the MRTA had been active as recently as a month prior to the attack, reports of this
activity had not reached the press. In an interview with the New York Times, John Caro, former
head of Pern’s anti-terrorism police,, gave as much credit for the success of the attack to the
forgetfulness and laziness of the government anti-terrorist forces as he did to the genius of the
MRTA strategists. In a classic example of closing the bam door after the horses had escaped,
Fujimori immediately gave orders that the compound be surrounded by counter-terrorism forces.
Most of whom could do little but stand on the fray and wonder what was happening inside the
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darkened embassy. Within two days, Peruvian stocks fell 4%, and tour cancellations ran at 30%
of total bookings,^^

The immediate logistical problem of hostages aside, Fujimori immediately faced much
greater problems. Technically, the Peruvian state did not have jurisdiction over the territory on
which the Japanese embassy stood. By diplomatic convention, the property was officially
Japanese, and any action on behalf of Peruvian forces which took place on the Japanese grounds
necessitated clearance from the Japanese state. Inside the house were Peruvian citizens, which
he had a responsibility to assist, but the number of Peruvians was slight compared to the number
of foreign diplomats, businessmen, and citizens. Originating from 13 different countries,
including Peru’s greatest economic investors, the United States and Japan, the situation was
much more complicated than a standard MRTA incident. Similar attacks had been staged in the
past, but never one with such far-reaching international implications and such immediate media
coverage. If this had been a regular attack, the MRTA would have faced much higher chances of
swift armed intervention. The precedent, set throughout a decade of guerrilla-state warfare, was
that of zero tolerance. However, this position frequently resulted in death for hostage-taker and
hostages alike, and often drew fire from international human rights groups. Within the Peruvian
electorate, however, his hard-line stance was a significant contributor to Fujimori’s popularity
and his reputation as a “tough-guy.”

The Japanese were well aware of Fujimori’s history with armed groups, as well as his
history of military interventions. During the first minutes of the attack, a cellular phone call from
a well trained diplomat alerted officials in Tokyo to the crisis. A half hour after the call. Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sent a communique to Fujimori, urging him to wait for demands and
possible negotiations. This would set the tone for the remainder of the negotiations. Japan knew
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well that the embassy was legally theirs, and that the ultimate resolution of the crisis should rest
with Tokyo. Given his impulsive and violent history with similar groups, they repeatedly tried
to make sure that Fujimori didn’t forget it.

Upon surveying the restrictions, the audience, and the risks, Fujimori had no choice but
to abandon his traditional modus operandi and weigh the alternatives. By December 21, in a
televised speech four days after the attack. President Fujimori reiterated his refusal to make
concessions. The positions of the major players remained fixed - Fujimori said repeatedly that
he would not give in to lawless criminals, and Hashimoto said he did not want to risk the lives of
the 72 remaining captives by a sudden rescue attempt. He would, however, study a nonviolent
“way out” if the guerrillas laid down their arms and freed all hostages. This position, which
appears identical to his former refusal to negotiate, actually represented a significant divergence
from tradition for the Fujimori administration. Fujimori never made an effort to pacify
Sucmllas, rather, he focused on complete eradication of other insurgent elements within
Peruvian society. Even by considering allowing them a way out, he breached his former
absolutist position, and made possible what would become the longest hostage negotiation
process in Latin American history.^^

Government negotiator Domingo Palmero entered the residence for the first time on
December 26, beginning face-to-face negotiations with the MRTA. As promised, approximately
twenty hostages were released. The Tupac Amarus, themselves masters of propaganda,
recognized the value of maintaining good public relations and keeping themselves on the front
page around the world. They did this through a constant trickle of hostage releases, signs,
interviews, photo shoots, and use of the Internet. In doing so, they aimed to prevent the Fujimori
administration from acting as gatekeepers to the press. Had he been able to do so, Fujimori
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could have effectively demonized their efforts, and successfully portrayed them as murderous
terrorists rather than modern-day Robin Hoods. By making sure to control and feed information
to the growing cadre of press corps outside the embassy compound, at one point totaling 700, the
MRTA made sure of the “spin” put on this event. On days when the negotiations slowed, they
hung a sign in the window and fired shots to re-focus attention. A sign seen more than once
read: Peru: 13 million in extreme poverty - where is the progress?” Another indication of the
international attention attained by the MRTA may be found on the Internet. Since the taking of
the Lima embassy, the MRTA home page has received 147,400 hits.^ Prior to 1996, it didn’t
even have a home page.

In contrast with this, Fujimori said nothing. Reportedly, this was “necessary to protect
the lives of the hostages during the negotiations.” For nearly a month after the initial siege, no
reports or official statements were made regarding the crisis. This silence allowed the guerrillas
to control the dialogue, and eventually added to Fujimori’s image problem. Sally Bowen, head
of the Foreign Press Club in Peru, commented that “The government lost a major opportunity to
get its point across to the foreign press.” Fujimori’s popularity ratings, already slumping in the
past year due to a stagnated economy, sank from 75 percent to 45 percent the month after the
hostage were taken.

The ongoing release of hostages did more than serve as good PR, it would also solve
growing organizational problems surrounding the issues of guarding such a large number of
captives. Over the next month, two to three hostages were released each day, keeping both the
negotiators and the international media hopeful. By January 15, nearly a month after the attack,
the rebels agreed to a negotiation commission, providing that everything, including freedom for
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jailed comrades, be on the negotiation table. Yet again, Fujimori abandoned his prior position of
“no negotiations” and appeared ready to make some sort of a deal.

At this point, with negotiations between the government and the rebels set to begin, it
became clear that Japan was not entirely comfortable with the directions taken by Peruvian
forces. Despite the fact that Japan had been quietly urging Peru towards a “peaceful resolution”
since the beginning, Peruvian forces were evidently forgetting that Japan was entitled to
consultation.'*^ In keeping With their history, military troops outside the compound had
reportedly engaged in exchanges of fire with the rebels. In the most serious incident, the rebels
shot at a police car circling the compound after the police made obscene gestures in their
direction. Soon thereafter, the troops and tanks outside the residence were doubled in an flagrant
war of intimidation.

Japan, wary of escalation and hoping to redirect attention onto the

mediation process, called on President Fujimori to meet with Prime Minister Hashimoto in
Toronto, Canada.^^

The nine-point communique (See Appendix #2) which resulted from the Toronto summit
was headed by an agreement that Peru will now seek “the commencement of preliminary
dialogues” with the MRTA. The other points embraced the positive intentions, especially ‘to
achieve a peaceful resolution to this incident.” Behind the diplomatic niceties, Japan largely
attempted to secure Fujimori’s guarantee that he would not act rashly, contrary to the process of
negotiations. To assure that Japan’s role in the conflict was not to be forgotten, Japan’s Mexican
ambassador was given an official role in the crisis team.

In a surprise move, Hashimoto, did not urge Fujimori to consider releasing he demanded
MRTA prisoners, as he’d reportedly been planning to do. Instead, the Japanese leader asserted
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in his communique that he “supported President Fujimori in his rejection of the MRTA’s demand
for the release of MRTA terrorists.” Just as Fujimori had diverted from standard protocol by
agreeing to the Japanese requests of negotiation, the Japanese were reciprocating this effort by
bending from their aversion to absolutist positioning. This summit, although widely accepted as
posturing and hardly as media-worthy as the events at the compound, signified a turning point in
the crisis. Fujimori, now bound by a legal obligation to diplomatic laws and a personal
agreement to negotiate, was locked into a course of action he would hardly have considered
otherwise. Japan, even with a long history of acceding to terrorists demands in order to extricate
itself from similar situations, found itself edged precariously close to endorsing a militaristic end.
By supporting Fujimori’s declared intent to not yield on the release of prisoners, which was the
MRTA’s primary demand, Japan passed on using their influential position of nearly controlling
interest over the Peruvian president to request a peaceful end. By not opposing his stubborn
refusal to negotiate, Japan might as well have endorsed the obviously doomed negotiations and
thus the eventual military solution.

Without any real concessions on the table for negotiations, the negotiations were
laborious and often centered on minute details. Real progress was seldom accomplished, as the
release of MRTA prisoners was never permitted for negotiation. Rebels would negotiate for a
week, and periodically suffered break-downs over the rebels’ demand that their comrades be
released from jail. At one point, Fujimori and the negotiators proposed a solution which would
allow the raiders themselves safe transport from Peru to Cuba for asylum. In an effort to
promote this solution, Fujimori traveled to Cuba and negotiated possible terms of transfer with
Fidel Castro. Soon after, on March 12, talks were once again called off by the rebels amidst
growing suspicions that the military forces were excavating tunnels beneath the home. Though
denied by the Peruvian government, on site news media and diplomats confirmed the tunneling.
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At this point, with talks stalled altogether and progress at a standstill, Japan re-entered
the negotiating arena. The Japanese foreign minister began talks in Peru, Cuba, and the
Dominican Republic. Reports circulating indicated that this deal was in process: if the hostages
agreed to the release the hostages and took asylum in Cuba, Peru would consider early parole for
some jailed comrades. Fujimori, however, vehemently denied the possibility of any such
agreement, meaningful talks once again halted, and rebels refused to allow even medical check
ups for the hostages.^^

The end came on a Wednesday afternoon, in broad daylight. Most of the rebels were
^XdiymgfiibaUto (minifootball) in the downstairs ballroom with a rolled up ball of carpet. Two
teenage girls watching the remaining 72 hostages upstairs, most of whom were reading books,
sleeping, or playing chess. In an explosion that shook the entire house, special force commandos
detonated a large explosive immediately below the soccer game, killing five instantly.
Immediately, other tunnels were blown open at points surrounding the house and compound.
Approximately 140 commandos entered the residence from tunnels, all doors, and neighboring
rooftops. Within five minutes, it was over with. One hostage, two soldiers, and all fourteen
rebels were dead.^*

AFTERMATH
Japan, which had asked from the beginning to be notified prior to the attack, was left
completely out of the loop. The attack came as a complete surprise to Prime Minister
Hashimoto. In Tokyo, with dawn just barely brightening the sky, Hashimoto was awakened at
5:23 a.m. to hear that his Peruvian embassy had been successfully stormed and retaken by
commando troops. All 24 Japanese hostages survived. Japanese citizens, by now grown
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accustomed to the unchanging images of the embassy on the nightly news, awoke to dramatic
footage of explosions, masked gunmen, and hostages frantically scrambling towards safety.
After speaking to freed ambassador Morihisa Aoki, Hashimoto appeared at a press conference.
He told his nation, with a grim look upon his face, that he “regretted” he had not been notified by
the Peruvian government in advance of it’s operation to free the hostages. In spite of this, he
congratulated the Peruvian leadership on the success of the risky assault. In a telephone
interview later that afternoon, he added that if he had been in Fujimori’s shoes, he might have
done the same thing. Hashimoto, whose position prior to the raid demanded Peru’s acquisition
of Japanese consent in advance of aggressive action, underwent a noticeable shift. In an
interview with Tokyo Times, he added “It is not important whether we had prior knowledge of
the move. The important thing is that the hostages were freed.” (See Appendix #3)

According to the Japan Times Weekly, April 25, 1997, the overwhelming public reaction
was first one of disbelief, then joy as the news came that the hostages had been rescued.^’ For
Japan, which has often been criticized for its historical hesitancy to take a stand against terrorists,
the news that a situation involving Japan had ended violently came as a surprise. After two
decades of concession, Japan at last had a taste of what it was like to not surrender to terrorist
demands. Hisahiko Okazaki, a former Japanese diplomat, was quoted in the Weekly about this
gradual shift towards public acceptance of the use of force. “No one openly supported the use of
force (to resolve the Lima crisis), but somehow it was understood” that such a response might be
necessary.^® This unexpected satisfaction extended from the public remarks of Prime Minister
Hashimoto to former diplomats and public opinion polls. Even Morihisa Aoki, Japan’s
ambassador to Lima and hostage for the entire 126 day duration, praised the way the crisis was
resolved. Government spokesman Hiroshi Hashimoto told reporters that the rebels in the
residence “deserved to be killed.” In the remainder of Mr. Okazaki’s comments, he expressed
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his belief that the acceptance of and positive reaction to the Lima crisis might be an indication
that Japan is becoming more comfortable with taking a stronger, more assertive role in the world.

These statements and apparent reactions stand in sharp contrast to similar crisis events
involving the Japanese. Even more out of place in modem Japan are the statements of
spokesman Hashimoto, where official statements (such as the nine-point communique released
two months prior) usually emphasized Japan’s pacifist role in international politics a benign
respect for human rights. Whatever the actual catalyst was, Japan emerged from the Lima crisis
with views greatly differing from those held at it s unforeseen entrance.

In Pern, public reactions to the embassy raid were mixed. On one hand, Pemvians
rejoiced that the hostages had been freed. On the other hand, the problems which gave rise to the
insurgent groups had not been addressed, and analysts quoted in the New York Times feel that
this crisis may sigmfy a fresh round of guerrilla violence in Peru. The week aher the crisis, the
Shining Path bombed three government offices in Lima, and TV reporters filmed another,
heavily armed group of MRTA rebels in the Andean jungle. For the first time in Fujimori’s
history in dealing with insurgent groups, he had allowed a process of negotiation as an option.
He did not follow it to completion, but the fact that he allowed the negotiation process to take
place marked a significant difference from previous dealings with armed groups. The door was
opened.

CONCLUSION
The events which transpired during and as a result of the Lima embassy hostage taking
altered the faces of Japanese and Peruvian political self-concept. It was a situation that neither
could fully direct, and both found themselves in unfamiliar diplomatic territory due to the other’s
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maneuverings. For Peru, it brought the realization that the guerrilla warfare that had
characterized the previous decade had not ceased, and that the military which had supposedly
subdued it had actually just covered up the newest resurgence. Fujimori’s handling of the events
leading up to the raid, his avoidance of the press corps, and dictatorial control of the situation
reminded Peruvians of why they’d first sent Fujimori into the presidency, as did it also give them
a realistic glimpse of his difficulties. Peruvians largely tolerated his authoritarian economic
tactics as a result of the perception that he was winning the was on terrorism. The embassy raid
by the MRTA destroyed this belief, as well as refocused public attention on his shortcomings.
Peruvians, well-lulled by reassurances, and now were awake to the reality that Fujimori was not
doing as well as he’d purported to be. Fujimori now faces the battle of bringing alienated
factions back into a society where 4 of every 5 people lack a steady job.^^ Much confidence in
his abilities and intentions has been lost, and he must bridge this gap in order to actualize an
overall pacification of the country.

For Japan, the prevailing acceptance of and satisfaction with the military solution to the
hostage crisis meant much more. The acceptance and approval of a forceful solution re
introduced the Japanese to an option of military force. Since World War II and the
“pacification” of Japan by U.S.-led forces, this has not been a viable option. While still lacking
the necessary troops, the concept has entered popular and political consideration. The Japanese
public, though not directly the aggressors in the rescue operation, followed the crisis like
Americans watched the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Despite decades of pacifist solutions and
little or no consideration of interventionary options, the Lima raid was a fresh ending to a
familiar problem. More importantly, it will be the most recent model of a successful resolution
to a hostage situation when the next hostage incident occurs. Japanese leaders will have to
surpass the widespread approval of this incident’s resolution in the event of a similar crisis.
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The global implications of the Lima hostage incident extend even further. This incident,
involving a number of nations and their accompanying policies on hostage negotiation
procedures, is likely to become more frequent. International business ventures and multi
national operations have put far more foreign citizens in target regions than ever before. Several
nations, such as the United States, send diplomats through mandatory training for coping with
hostage or attacks with intent to capture. Businesses with overseas offices have often sent
executives through similar seminars. Japan has committed to doing the same. With the chance
of similar events increasing, and more nations moving towards a policy of no negotiation, it is
perhaps indicative that the development of an international protocol for dealing with hostage
incidents is forthcoming.

The successful resolution to the Lima crisis will influence policy in another way, as well.
For the next decade, this example will remain fresh in the minds of government and insurgent
groups worldwide. As a result, I believe that governments will be less likely to concede to
demands, and more likely to attempt a rescue. Hostage groups, similarly aware of the results,
will be more prepared for such an advance. This will ultimately cause a shift in the nature of
groups taking hostages. Groups that actually want demands to be met will take less hostages, as
they will recognize that the odds of receiving concessions were lower. On the other hand, groups
which are seeking publicity or media coverage for a specific group or issue will take notice of the
attention given to the MRTA, and consider it as a workable option. The dramatic encore to the
Lima incident predicates that the media reaction to the next such crisis will be immediate and
extensive. As the world and it’s technology changes, so too do the types and objectives of
terrorists.
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The solutions found and shifts undergone by Japanese and Peruvians does more than to
delineate the clear differences between these nations. It exemplifies a situation which will
become more prevalent in the future, as well as hints at dominant issues in the future of hostage
crises. The Lima incident demonstrated the result of combining two nations, with sharply
contrasting protocols and histories, in a diplomatic experiment of crisis management. Two
approaches, mixed in the crucible of a shared experience, followed individual paths to a shared
resolution. In the end, one emerged with a clearer view of itself, and the other began to see a
side which had not existed for over fifty years. Neither emerged as it had entered.
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APPENDIX #1
Lima, 17th December, 1996
COMMUNIQUE #1
The National Direction of the Revolutionary Movement Tiipac Amaru adresses our beloved peruvian
peoples declare that today, Tueday, the 17th of December, at 8.25 p.m., the special force unit "EDGAR
SANCHEZ" of our organization has miltitarily occupied the residence of the ambassador of Japan and has
taken prisoners several personalities from politics, business and members of the diplomatic corps acredited
in Peru.
We have given this operatiuon the name of "c. OSCAR TORRES CONDESU" with the slogan:
"BREAKING THE SILENCE - THE PEOPLES WANT THEM FREE". This operation is under the
command of MRTA-commander c. HEMIGIDO HUERTA LOAYZA.
We declare that from the moment of the military occupation of the residence of the ambassador of Japan in
Peru, every measure has been taken to provide for the physical and moral integrity of the persons captured
there. We have realized this military ocupation in protest against the interference of the Japanese
government in the political life in our country, in every moment supporting the methods of violation of
human rights applied by the government of Mr. Fujimori, as well as its economic policy which has brought
nothing but increased misery and hunger to the majority of the people of Peru.
We also communicate to our peoples that we have been forced to take to this extreme measure in order to
save the life of dozens of members and leaders of our organization, who suffer imprisonment under
subhuman conditions and under a prison order which aims at their physical and mental annihilation. They
are imprisoned in true "grave prisons", as Mr. Alberto Fujimori has repeatedly confirmed with the words
"there they will rot and will only get out dead", which shows an irrational rage against social fighters who
have risen in arms to fight for the well-being of our peoples.
In this sense, we state with the same emphasis with which we declare that we are respecting the physical
integrity of the captured persons, that we will only free them if the government complies with the following
demands:
That the government commits itself to change the economical course in favour of a model which aims at the
well-being of the great majorities. That all prisoners belonging to the MRTA and every prisoner accused of
belonging to our organization be set free. Transfer of the commando that entered the residence of the
Japanese ambassador together with all the c. prisoners from the MRTA to the central jungle. As guarantee,
some of the captured persons, who will be selected correspondingly, will also come along. They will be set
free when we have reached our guerilla zone. Payment of a war-tax.
The MRTA has always been an organization disposed to answer proposals for dialogue, but it has only
found repulsion and scorn from the government. Today we are in confrontation, and it must be clear that
any military option which puts the life of the captured persons in danger will be at the absolute
responsibility of the government, as well as any other action which we might have to take if the government
does not respond to our demands.
WITH THE MASSES AND THE ARMS, PATRIA O MUERTE VENCEREMOS!
National Direction of the MRTA
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APPENDIX #2
Joint Press Statement of the Japan-Republic of Peru Summit
1 February 1997, Toronto
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan and President Alberto Fujimori of the Republic of Peru met on
1 February 1997 in Toronto, Canada, in accordance with an agreement between the Governments of Japan
and Peru.
The purpose of this meeting was to hold a frank and serious exchange of views in order to achieve a
peaceful resolution to the terrorist incident of the seizure of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima
perpetrated by the terrorist group calling itself the MRTA.
1. The two leaders strongly condemned the terrorist incident of the seizure of the Japanese Ambassador's
residence in Peru as an act unacceptable to either government as well as to the entire international
community, and reaffirmed their determination not to give in to terrorism.
2. The two leaders reaffirmed their intent to intensify their efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to this
incident, and to secure the full release of all the hostages at the earliest possible time, based upon the
position of placing the highest priority on respect for human life.
3. The Toronto meeting reasserted the need for the closest collaboration and coordination between the
Governments of Japan and the Republic of Peru in order to bring this incident to an end. In light of this, the
two leaders agreed to promote the commencement of preliminary dialogs between the interlocutor of the
Peruvian Government and the representative of the MRTA group currently inside the Japanese
Ambassador's residence, in the hope that these dialogs would be realized as soon as possible.
4. The two leaders agreed that these dialogs should be conducted in a manner consistent with full respect for
the legal system of Peruvian State, as well as for all the relevant and applicable principles of international
law.
5. In accordance with the above-mentioned. Prime Minister Hashimoto supported President Fujimori in his
rejection of the MRTA's demand for the release of the MRTA terrorists currently in incarceration, a
position which was in agreement with the opinion of the entire international community.
6. The Japanese Government endorsed the position of the Peruvian Government that the preservation of the
hostages' physical mental health was an indispensable element for the development of dialog aimed at a
peaceful resolution.
7. The two leaders welcomed the fact that members of the Commission of Guarantors had met on 28
January, and highly commended the continuing efforts by the Commission of Guarantors to realize the
earliest possible direct dialog between the interlocutor of the Peruvian Government and the MRTA group
inside the Japanese Ambassador's residence. It was agreed that in the meetings of the Commission of
Guarantors, Ambassador Terusuke Terada would be present as the official observer from the Government
of Japan.
8. Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed his full confidence in the Peruvian Government's handling of this
incident, and asserted that his Government would continue to give its full support to the effort to achieve the
shared objective of the release of all of the hostages.
9. The two leaders expressed their deepest appreciation for all the cooperation provided by the Government
of Canada for the realization of this meeting.
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APPENDIX #3
Comment to the Press by Prime Minister Hashimoto
on His Telephone Conversation with President Fujimori
Peru, Lima
March 27, 1997
At 9 a.m. this morning, I telephoned President Fujimori and had serious discussions for 50 minutes. I
expressed my gratitude to him for the fact that he spent long hours with Mr. Komura during his visit to Peru
as my special envoy and for the tremendous efforts the President made toward finding a solution for the past
100 days.
Bearing in mind that the President himself had mentioned the other day that Samana Santa should be the
period of reflection, I told the President to reflect in the real sense during this period and to set a course to
bring about the peaceful solution as promptly as possible.
In essence that is what I told the President. I would like to add that our conversations were very serious.
However, I should stop here and avoid going into detail, because we are going through a very sensitive
period. In particular, the President asked me not to go beyond saying that we had serious conversations,
because the news in Japan is picked up and carried by the Peruvian mass media immediately.
Naturally, the members of the Committee of Guarantors are making efforts even while Arch Bishop Cipriani
isout of town right now, but we may not see any substantial developments until the Arch Bishop comes back
to Lima presumably on Monday. This is why I am hoping that the best option will emerge from our
reflections over these next several days.
Thank you.
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APPENDIX #4

Press Conference by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
on the Situation at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence in the
Republic of Peru
23 April 1997 07; 15 - 07:22 (Tokyo time)
Press Conference Room at the Official Residence of the Prime Minister
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: Special forces of the Peruvian military stormed the Japanese
Ambassador's Residence in the Republic of Peru at 3:23 p.m. yesterday Peru time.
The Cabinet immediately called for a meeting of the Headquarters and gathered information while keeping
a close watch on the developments of the situation at the Ambassador's Residence. At 6:43 this morning
Japan time Ambassador Aoki was able to speak directly with me on the phone after being rescued. All of
the Japanese hostages were safely rescued, and a few of them have sustained light injuries. However, none
of those are serious. Right now we are in the process of confirming everyone, one-by-one, and determining
the degree of their injuries.
Unfortunately, Japan was not informed prior to the initiation of this rescue operation.
While I must say that it is regrettable that Japan did not learn of the action in advance, I would like once
again to express my gratitude to President Alberto Fujimori and the other members of the Government of
Peru who seized the opportunity and carried out this remarkable rescue operation.
Among the media reports that have come out, there are some reports that some of the Peruvian military
personnel involved have been killed and wounded. My heart grieves for the dead and wounded and for their
bereaved families.
Ambassador Aoki, and Mrs. Aoki, whom I also spoke with on the phone, were in extremely good spirits. It
seems that Ambassador Aoki has a slight injury to his elbow, but he sounded great and told me that "It is
just a slight scratch."
The Ambassador said that he intends personally to visit all of the hospitals where the injured are. At any
rate, efforts to confirm the safety of all involved have already begun.
The Government of Japan has decided to dispatch Foreign Minister Ikeda to Lima today in order to take any
measures which will be necessary following what has happened.
If the situation is as it seems to be, there probably is no need for the medical team which we prepared in
advance. Still, considering that those hostages who were held for such a long time may be prone to fatigue
after they are relieved, I have given instructions that preparations be made to dispatch the medical team as
well. Also, I have instructed the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission and the DirectorGeneral of the National Police Agency to prepare to send their staff members to Lima to investigate and
confirm everything that has occurred since the incident broke out.
I have given you a report on the situation as it is and I am glad to be able to share with you the joyous news
that the hostages are all right. Furthermore, although the reports are still not confirmed, if it is true that some
of the members of the Peruvian military who participated in this rescue operation have been killed or
injured, then I would like to express my heartfelt condolences and prayers that their injuries are light ones.
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We will be reporting on the situation to the countries who have been so generous with assistance during this
incident and to thank them. I would like to express my deep gratitude to the many individuals who, in this
extremely difficult situation, showed their goodwill and gave us their cooperation. That is all that I have to
tell you now.
Q. Earlier just now you said that there was no prior notification. How did you learn of the storming by the
Peruvian military forces.
Prime Minister Hashimoto: As of 5:30 a.m., I had not yet heard, but I received a phone call immediately
after the reports of the storming came through.
Q. Who called you?
Prime Minister Hashimoto: I received calls fi-om several of my assistants and fi-om the Headquarters. I will
take only one more question.
Q. You stated that you hoped to see a peaceful solution. However, in fact the military forces stormed the
residence. What are your thoughts on that?
Prime Minister Hashimoto: We truly hoped that this situation would end without incident and not through a
forced storming of the Residence. Still, those were the thoughts of people in a location separated by 14 time
zones fi’om those who were there watching the situation. It is natural that there was a difference. I wonder if
there is anyone who could criticize President Fujimori for the use of force now that the hostages have been
safely rescued, whether or not there was prior notification.
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APPENDIX #5
I.Hostage crisis in the Republic of Peru. Briefing given by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hiroshi
Hashimoto:
At 15:23 Peru time, on 22 April, a special unit of the
Peruvian Armed Forces stormed the Japanese Ambassador's Residence, bringing an end to the four
month-long occupation of the residence by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto has already held two press conferences on this incident this morning.
Through these press conferences, I am sure that you have already learned of the developments which
have occurred and of Japan's position on this incident. For the record, I will go through these one more
time for your benefit. I understand that one official of the Peruvian Supreme Court who was being held
hostage and two members of the special forces were killed. I express my sincere condolences to these
victims and their bereaved families.
We have been able to confirm that the 71 hostages, including 24 Japanese nationals, were successfully
rescued. Although some of them are reported to have injuries such as bums and bmises, no one has
been seriously harmed. The Government of Japan highly appreciates the miraculous way that this
operation was handled without yielding to terrorism.
Prime Minister Hashimoto spoke for 20 minutes on the telephone with President Alberto Fujimori of the
Republic of Pern this morning. Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed his gratitude to President Fujimori
and the other members of the Pemvian Government who seized the opportunity to implement this
difficult operation successfully. Although he regretted that there had been no prior notification on this
rescue operation. Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed his understanding of the situations leading up to
President Fujimori's decision given the subtle timing of the strategy. President Fujimori asked Prime
Minister Hashimoto to convey a message to the people of Japan that he regretted the long time it took
to solve this incident, but that Peru had been able to bring this incident to closure without giving in to
terrorism, and he expressed his appreciation for the trust which the people of Japan had shown him and
his Government.
Minister for Foreign Affairs Yukihiko Ikeda will depart for Lima at around 20:00 this evening. Foreign
Minister Ikeda will be taking with him a team of National Police Agency investigators and medical
specialists.
I would like to take this opportunity to express the respect of the Government of Japan for the
tremendous patience and endurance with which the hostages passed this ordeal. We intend to do all that
we can to help all of the hostages to recover and return to their normal lives.
In the days to come, the Government of Japan will be reporting on the situation and thanking all of the
countries which have been so gracious with various forms of assistance during this ordeal. We are truly
appreciative of the continued support and solidarity shown by the international community. Here again, I
must express my heartfelt gratitude to the many people who cooperated so much during the last four
months.
11. Prior notification
Q: Regarding what Prime Minister Hashimoto said about prior notification, throughout this crisis, Japan,
and you yourself, have said that prior notification would be necessary for any armed resolution to this
problem. What is your feeling now on the lack of prior notification?
Spokesman Hashimoto: President Fujimori repeatedly told us and the public that the Peruvian
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Government would not take military action so long as the MRTA would not injure the hostages. In
general, we expected that if that happened and President Fujimori had to decide to take actions, he
would notify Prime Minister Hashimoto of these actions. As Prime Minister Hashimoto said, we
regretted that this was not done, but at the same time, we understand the situation. As Prime Minister
Hashimoto said in the press conference today, we understand the difficult situation, and President
Fujimori, as supreme commander, had decided to take advantage of this opportunity. We are very
grateful that this incident is over. Unfortunately, three people were killed.
Q: This excludes the kidnappers, because more than three people were killed.
Spokesman Hashimoto: As far as the MRTA is concerned, they deserve to be killed.
Q: So, the Japanese Government never at any time gave its blessing, so to speak, to President Fujimori
to conduct an operation of this kind should the need arise? Was there any discussion that he could make
this decision on his own if it was deemed necessary?
Spokesman Hashimoto: President Fujimori expressed his regrets to Prime Minister Hashimoto over the
telephone today that he could not give notification regarding these actions. Now that this incident has
been brought to a successful end, we should understand that President Fujimori made decisions on his
own regarding the timing, the actions, etc., and it was miraculous that only very limited numbers of
people were killed during this operation.
Q: What if there was no notification and it did not turn out in such a favorable way?
Spokesman Hashimoto: Probably, we should think about the successful result which we, of course,
wanted. One official of the Supreme Court was killed, I am sure that his family is very saddened over
this incident. However, other than this loss the incident was resolved very peacefully. Knowing this, we
say that although we regret that we were not told before the move, we are able to understand this
situation very well.
Q: There was a newspaper report that Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Fujimori had exchanged
documents, or signed some kind of agreement, in Toronto that Peru would notify Japan before taking
military action. Does such a document exist, or is the agreement verbal? If this is a very formal
agreement, do you consider the Peruvian action in violation of this?
Spokesman Hashimoto: In Toronto, there was no paper signed between Prime Minister Hashimoto and
President Fujimori. The two Governments issued a joint press statement in Toronto. On the basis of this,
the two gentlemen went to their press conferences. At that time. President Fujimori clearly stated that he
would not use force unless the hostages were threatened or injured by the MRTA. Prime Minister
Hashimoto supported what President Fujimori said and he clearly warned the MRTA not to make any
threats against the hostages. Of course, I must tell you that the Government of Japan, in general, wanted
to bring this incident to an end peacefully. In general terms, we expected that prior notification would be
given if President Fujimori were to take military action; this was not the case. However, Prime Minister
Hashimoto expressed his understanding of the situation where President Fujimori could not provide
prior notification. We are very appreciative that this difficult operation brought a successful end to the
four month-long hostage incident.
Q: When Prime Minister Hashimoto says that he understands the circumstances of not notifying the
Japanese Government, what does he mean by "circumstances"? What circumstances does he
understand?
Spokesman Hashimoto: He understood the timing of taking the action. He understood why President
Fujimori could not notify Japan of the actions before the actual operation. Prime Minister Hashimoto
understood the difficult situation under which President Fujimori acted.
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III. Timing of the storming of the Japanese Ambassador's Residence
Q: What is your understanding of the timing of this incident?
Spokesman Hashimoto: The headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not aware at all that
this kind of military action would take place today. However, in general terms, we expected that
President Fujimori might take military action if the MRTA did something wrong in regard to the
hostages. In light of this, we prepared ourselves for what we should do in the case that military action
was taken. However, we simply were not aware of any signs that force was going to be used.
Q: Is there any indication that the hostages were threatened with violence and that is what prompted
President Fujimori to begin military action?
Spokesman Hashimoto: So far, what we know about the operation is very limited. Ambassador
Morihisa Aoki said in his press conference that he personally did not know very much about the
operation itself I think it will take some time for us to be fully informed of the process of the operation.
IV. Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Peru
Q: This afternoon. Ambassador Aoki said that for him to continue in his job depends on the attitude of
the Japanese Government. Do you have any comment on that?
Spokesman Hashimoto: First of all, we are very appreciative that he has carried out his responsibility
very successfully. For the time being, we must take care of the people who have been injured. Foreign
Minister Ikeda is flying to Lima. There are many things to do before we ceui say anything in regard to
your question. In any case, we are happy that we have that kind of responsible, calm and confident
ambassador.
V. Police investigations at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence
Q: In this morning's press conference. Prime Minister Hashimoto said that President Fujimori asked for
the ambassador's residence to be closed for two days. What is the Japanese response to this?
Spokesman Hashimoto: We have given our consent to this. With the cooperation of a team of national
police in Lima, I think that the Japanese Ambassador's Residence will be closed for two days.
However, together with Foreign Minister Ikeda, another team of National Police Agency investigators
will fly to Lima. So, with the cooperation of the Peruvian police, I think that the necessary investigations
can be carried out in Lima.
VI. Japan-Republic of Peru discussions on hostage crisis responses
Q: Were you consulted on the nature of the military response?
Spokesman Hashimoto: Not if you are talking about a concrete plan. However, our team in Lima
consulted various people, for example, the police which were engaged in first aid, etc., on what we
should do in the event of a crisis. This was carried out on the basis that some kind of crisis might
happen, which does not mean that the Peruvian Government was contemplating taking action in
cooperation with Japan.
VII. Protection of Japanese embassies
Q: Will the experience of the last four months change the way the Japanese embassies are protected in
countries around the world?
Spokesman Hashimoto: When we found out that the MRTA had seized the residence, we started to
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investigate and study what we should leam from this incident. Also, under the Foreign Minister, a small
committee was established and has already been operating regarding how to more effectively protect
our overseas establishments. In addition to this, this morning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established
another committee of investigations. We must study many things regarding this incident, e.g., why it
happened, what we should leam from the incident, what sort of protection we should provide, etc.
IX. Death of MRTA members at the Japanese Ambassador's Residence
Q: The report said that 14 members of the MRTA are dead. Is there any report as to how they were
killed? And, what is the reaction of the Japanese Government on the fact that 14 members are now
dead?
Spokesman Hashimoto: We are not aware of the details of the operation itself Therefore, I cannot tell
you how they were killed. I have already told you that they deserved to be killed.
X. Negotiations during the hostage crisis
Q: Do you have any opinion on why the negotiation process was unsuccessful in this case?
Spokesman Hashimoto: Again, we must review why Archbishop Cipriani's mediating efforts could not
bear a tangible result. We very much appreciated that he enthusiastically mediated between the Pemvian
Government and the MRTA. However, from the very start of the incident. President Fujimori stated that
he would not allow any MRTA members in prison to be released. At the same time, we knew that the
MRTA strongly demanded the Government to release MRTA members. So, \\4iat Archbishop Cipriani,
together with other members of the Commission of Guarantors, could do was very limited. However,
Archbishop Cipriani was extremely sincere in dealing with this incident. Unfortunately, the MRTA
demands for release of prisoners did not change up until the last moment.
Q; You mentioned that this was a successful mission, although perhaps the Japanese Government was
not ready for it. Do you think that the Japanese Government will perhaps change its policy in dealing
with terrorists in future hostage situations should they arise?
Spokesman Hashimoto: Japan is a member of the G-7 countries or P-8 countries, which have been
denouncing terrorism. In this incident, that principle has been adhered to with gratitude to the actions
taken by President Fujimori. I believe that our policy will continue as such in the future.
XI.Other hostage situations in Japanese history
Q: Can you think of any other incidents in recent times where a hostage situation involving Japanese was
resolved by use of force?
Spokesman Hashimoto: No, I do not recall any incidents. This was the first time that Japanese
Government officials together with other civilians and foreign dignitaries were taken hostage. So, many
things are very new to us. In the past, the Japanese Embassy was seized by terrorists, but this was a
long time ago. I cannot give you precise information on how we solved this incident. But, for a long
time, a hostage incident of this kind has not taken place. This is a new experience for us. In the last four
months, we have learned quite a lot from this incident. So, I am sure that we can take more appropriate
actions if any similar incident takes place in the future. Of course, we do not want this to luqjpen.
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